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On May 30, 1967, the Heads of State and Heads of 
Government of the six European Community countries, 
meeting in Rome, decided that the Executives of the 
three Communities - the High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the Commissions of the 
European Economic Community and of Euratom -
should merge from the following July 1. The powers and 
obligations vested in the High Authority by the Paris 
Treaty have therefore devolved upon the single Commis-
sion of the European Communities. At this important 
juncture in European affairs, it is worth looking at what 
the oldest of the Communities, the ECSC, had, after 
fifteen years of existence, contributed to the unification 
of Europe. It should be emphasized that although this 
pamphlet describes what the High Authority did, those 
same functions and duties are still being performed -
by the single Commission. 
ALBERT COPPE 
Vice-President of the 
ECSC 
High Authority /952-1967 

The European Coal and Steel Community 
"Resolved to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion 
of their essential interests; to establish, by creating an 
economic community, the basis of a wider and deeper 
community among peoples long divided by bloody 
conflicts; and to lay the foundations of institutions 
capable of guiding their future common destiny ... " 
From the preamble to the Paris Treaty of April 18, 1951. 
Twice in a generation Europe has been through the 
horrors of total war. Today, to those in their twenties, 
that nightmare is remote and difficult to imagine. Yet it 
happened not a quarter of a century ago. It took a revolu-
tion in political attitudes to overcome the enmities that 
had so harmed Europe over past centuries. It took bold 
men to put forward, only five years after the tempest of 
hatred had ended, a plan by which victors and vanquished 
would embark on a joint political venture. 
In May 1950, the French Government, through its 
Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed to the rest 




unification. Thus was born the original, epoch-making 
concept establishing a 
COMMUNITY 
of the peoples of Europe. 
What is the meaning of that word - Community, 
Communaute, Gemeinschaft, Comunita, Gemeenschap? 
HCommunity" means a new system of political relations 
between States ; it also means a new system of economic 
organization. 
A new system of relations between States 
A legacy of the Roman Empire was that for many 
centuries a large part of Europe, although politically 
fragmented, shared a religious faith and a common 
culture. As this bond weakened there followed, from the 
seventeenth century onwards, the rise of the sovereign 
nation-state. In the course of time national sovereignty 
degenerated into an arrogant, aggressive nationalism which 
sought to restore European unity by force. But each 
attempt only led to bloodshed and ruin. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries another 
way of preserving European stability was sought - the 
balance of power, the forming of delicate political and mili-
tary alliances between sovereign States. But this system, 
too, failed to avert major clashes. In fact, it was based 
largely on the pursuit of national interests - and 
frequently misconceived interests at that. As a result, it 
exacerbated nationalism and in the end plunged Europe 
into the abyss of the First World War. 
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The Community concept rejects untting Europe 
according to the will of the strongest. But, equally, there 
has never been any intention of assembling sovereign 
States in a permanent diplomatic conference with every 
delegate possessing a veto. Nor is the Community a mere 
compromise between these two irreconcilable systems. 
The Community represents an original, realistic ap-
proach. Its structure takes account both of the relative 
importance of the different countries and of the need to 
safeguard the interests of the smaller members against 
arbitrary action by the larger states. At the same time it 
opens the way to vigorous, concerted action. The Commu-
nity can do this because of its common Institutions. 
The keystone of the Community organization is the 
continuous dialogue between the Commission, the Insti-
tution which ascertains and upholds the common interest 
of the member States, and another Institution, the Coun-
cil of Ministers, which is independent of and distinct 
from the first, and which co-ordinates the Community's 
own action with the work of the individual member 
governments. 
This principle was first applied in 
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY (ECSC) 
which was set up, following the Schuman Declaration, 
under a Treaty signed in Paris in April 1951 by the Bel-
gian, Dutch, French, Federal German, Italian and Lux-
embourg Governments. The ECSC was a pilot project 
for (to quote the Declaration) Hthe creation of a de 
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facto solidarity among European countries." Prudence, 
prompted by past experience, counselled against attempts 
to unite Europe overnight. 
The sectors chosen for this pilot project were coal 
and steel, not merely because these were the two most 
important basic materials in the European economy, but 
also, and primarily, because they symbolized the basis 
of the military power which European states had so often 
used against one another. Now they were to be the first 
components in the building of Europe by peaceful means. 
From the beginning, however, the ECSC was, as the pre-
amble of the Paris Treaty states, designed to serve as 
"the basis of a wider and deeper community" among the 
peoples of Europe. 
The ECSC Institution which upheld the common 
interest of the member countries and which has now been 
merged in the single Commission was 
THE HIGH AUTHORITY. 
Before its merger on July 1, 1967, with the EEC and 
Euratom Commissions, the High Authority consisted of 
nine members. Unlike the system in most international 
organizations, these members were not representatives 
of their governments. They represented the Community as 
a whole and were appointed with the consent of all six 
governments. The Paris Treaty did not even stipulate 
that there must be at least one member of each nationality, 
though in practice this was always the case. 
The High Authority's decisions were by straight 
majority vote. 
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What was really original about the High Authority, 
however, was not so much its voting system as its modus 
operandi. It did not proceed on normal diplomatic lines, 
seeking to reach compromises by negotiation. Delegates 
did not exploit each other's difficulties and weaknesses 
in order to obtain concessions for their own country. 
The High Authority worked out settlements that \\'ere fair 
and beneficial to all: it regarded each country's particular 
difficulties as Community difficulties which had to be taken 
into account in any settlement. 
To carry out its tasks, the High Authority was, and 
its successor the European Commission is, empowered 
to levy a fixed proportion - at present 0.3% - of the val-
ue of coal and steel produced within the Community. The 
proceeds of this first "European tax" made it finan-
cially independent, and covered its overheads and the 
retraining, redevelopment and research grants described 
below. 
A Consultative Committee of producers', workers' 
and consumers' representatives advised the High Au-
thority. 
The High Authority's partner institution was 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
consisting of one representative of each member govern-
ment. Though in many cases the High Authority could act 
on its own, in important matters it had to confer with the 
Council, or even obtain its specific consent, before taking 
a decision. The Council's consent might have to be unan-
imous or by straight or weighted majority. Interaction 
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of these two separate Institutions, the High Authority and 
the Council, increasingly constituted the basis of the Com-
munity method. By regularly confronting the general 
interest, as established by the High Authority, and the 
individual interests of the member States, as propounded 
in the Council, this method enabled solutions to be reached 
in fields where the member States' interests, in the short 
run at any rate, were extremely divergent, as, for instance, 
in the energy sector. 
The High Authority had independent powers of deci-
sion, and its decisions automatically had the force of law 
in member countries. It was therefore necessary that its 
activities should be subject to proper democratic checks 
and balances. 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
(formerly the Common Assembly) exercised political 
supervision over all that the High Authority did. It could 
pass a vote of censure in the debate on the General Report 
which the High Authority had to submit to it each year. 
In addition, through its various Committees, it kept a 
constant watch on the High Authority's day-to-day 
activities. The Parliament's powers were and are ad-
mittedly limited compared with those which the national 
parliaments have secured over the centuries : in particular, 
it did not and does not have the last word on budgetary 
matters. Nevertheless, it has from the outset been an essen-
tial link between the Community Institutions and the peo-
ples of Europe whom it represents. At present it consists of 
142 members of the six national Parliaments, although the 
Treaty provides for eventual direct election of its members. 
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There was always the possibility that High Authority 
decisions might injure the interest of firms or States. It 
was therefore necessary to provide for judicial supervision 
of those decisions whereby Community subjects would be 
safeguarded against any abuse of power by the High Au-
thority. This function was· and is exercised by 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
consisting of seven Judges and two Advocates-General. 
The Court ensured that the High Authority's interpretation 
and application of the Treaty was good in law. It had power 
to reverse High Authority decisions. 
Such was the institutional framework of the first 
European Community, later adopted in essence by the two 
other Communities and now confirmed with the single 
institutional structure for all three Communities. It 
constitutes a new legal system of relations between States 
based on democratic principles. The system is neither a 
national nor, in the traditional sense, an international 
system. It is a Community system. 
A new system of economic organization 
The value of the Community concept made itself 
apparent not only in the political and legal but also in the 
economic field. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century 
there was often an exaggerated emphasis on free enterprise 
or laisser-faire. In the first half of the twentieth century this 
led to a swing in the other direction, to totalitarianism, 
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extensive state control and comprehensive centralized 
planning. One of the great tasks of our own time is to work 
out a compromise between these two extremes which will 
reconcile the freedom of the individual with the degree of 
organization needed in our highly technical society. 
The Paris Treaty has undoubtedly contributed to this 
aim. The European Community has placed national 
economic problems in a new and more appropriate per-
spective, that of 
THE COMMON MARKET. 
Experience has shown that these problems can no longer 
be effectively tackled in small national markets of ten mil-
lion to 50 million consumers. Today one must think in 
terms of 150 million to 300 million people. 
Modern economic and political organization has made 
the old European nation-sized unit obsolete. 
What is a common market? It is an enlarged market 
created by abolishing all barriers to trade between the com-
ponent national markets - such as customs duties, quotas, 
currency restrictions, discriminatory pricing, variations 
in cross-frontier transport rates. But it is essentially a 
common economic system bas~d on this enlarged market, 
and given concrete form by common rules and common 
policies. 
Establishing this new system has clearly been the 
hardest part of the process of European unification. 
In face of the immense variety of traditions and interests 
which have developed over the centuries in Europe, it 
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was bold indeed to wish to create such a system, even in 
the single limited sector of coal and steel. Nevertheless, 
as on the political side, the lessons of history made action 
imperative. 
The common market for coal and steel is based on the 
principle of competition: that is, it is organized so that the 
most rational distribution of production at the highest level 
of productivity is achieved. 
Past experience - for example, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s which extended all over the world - shows, 
however, that there is no such thing as a self-regulating 
market immune to recessions and other crises. 
Competition in coal and steel was therefore subjected 
to rules whose observance the High Authority supervised. 
Some rules are designed to ensure market integration, by 
enforcing publication of prices, prohibiting discriminatory 
practices and eliminating State subsidies and special 
charges liable to distort competition. Other rules aim at 
promoting competition by examining and banning, where 
necessary, cartels and other restrictive agreements be-
tween firms. Although one of the objects of the common 
market has been to encourage producers to exploit fully 
the technical and economic advantages of large-scale 
operation, care has been taken to prevent undue concen-
tration of firms which might dominate markets. 
The High Authority was also empowered to take cer-
tain short -term measures - such as fixing minimum or 
maximum prices and production quotas, or allocating pro-
duction - in the event of flooding of the market or grave 
shortage. 
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These are the traditional weapons of cyclical policy. 
The new elements in the structure instituted by the Paris 
Treaty concern long-term action and social policy: taken 
together, they were the first steps to a European industrial 
policy. This part of the Treaty has been less affected by 
economic changes than many of the other provisions. 
Guiding investment 
The High Authority's General Objectives, worked 
out from the forecasts for the next five to ten years, 
enabled each individual firm to view its own plans in the 
context of general developments in the Community coal 
or steel industry. In addition to offering (not imposing) 
this guidance, the General Objectives formed the yard-
stick by which the High Authority drew up the official 
opinions it issued on the investment projects of which 
firms were obliged to inform it. These opinions, though not 
legally binding on the firm, nevertheless indirectly affected 
the trend of investment by helping potential lenders of 
capital to decide whether to support a particular scheme. 
Furthermore, it was on the basis of the General Ob-
jectives that the High Authority allocated to firms applying 
to it for investment loans the money it borrowed. 
Thus the High Authority could guide long-term devel-
opment of these Community industries flexibly - without 
direct interference in the companies' management with 
their rights in a free-market economy. 
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Technical research 
The Treaty also contains passages which amount 
to a first outline for a common policy on technical research, 
so important to Europe's future. The High Authority 
sponsored, co-ordinated and assisted research projects 
which it considered to be in the common interest, and 
could contribute non-repayable grants to their cost. 
Social affairs 
In addition to equipping the High Authority with 
these instruments of long-term economic policy, the Paris 
Treaty contains a number of important provisions on social 
affairs. Indeed, these are perhaps the most radical innova-
tions of all. The Treaty-makers fully realized that technical 
and economic progress involves continuous, rapid change 
in production techniques and business methods. Every 
economic system - capitalist, socialist or any other - is 
subject to the same law: progress depends on mobility. 
Now the need for adjustment may often mean hardship for 
workers. Firms may have to close, reduce production or 
change their methods, with serious effects on the economic 
balance of whole areas. 
The social provisions of the Paris Treaty are based 
on the principle that the impact of such adjustments should 
not be borne by the workers and that their cost should be 
jointly financed. The High Authority had to help workers 
by providing, jointly with the six governments, non-
repayable grants to tide redundant workers over the pe-
riod between jobs, pay for occupational retraining, and 
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refund their removal expenses if they accepted employ-
ment in another part of the Community. This system of 
readaptation, as it was called, has proved its worth, 
especially in the coal industry, which since 1958 has been 
undergoing a grave structural crisis. 
Retraining and resettlement aid on their own, how-
ever, alleviate rather than remedy, and so are not the full 
answer. The redundancies resulting from the crisis in 
the coal industry are not temporary; the workers will not 
be reabsorbed when business picks up again, for the coal 
industry will never again employ as many men as it once 
did. What is needed, then, is to attract, in advance of the 
actual closures, new industries to the coalfields affected, 
so that alternative employment will be available there for 
the miners when the pits cease production. 
This redevelopment policy, which the High Authority 
carried out in co-operation with the six governments, 
was especially important in the areas where coalmining 
used to be the main if not the only industrial activity. 
The Paris Treaty made the High Authority a pioneer 
in these fields and, like the organizational system it set up, 
its policies of '\*eadaptation" of workers and redevelop-
ment in industry are serving as models for the develop-
ment of the Community as a whole. 
The results 
The establishment of the common market for coal and 
steel and of the common institutions soon showed results: 
steel production boomed, trade in coal and steel expanded 
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considerably, and prices remained exceptionally steady. 
Miners' and steelworkers' wages and conditions generally 
improved. 
The gradual integration of the six national economies' 
coal and steel industries has led to closer contacts between 
producers, workers and consumers in the enlarged market. 
Experts from industry, governments and trade unions 
frequently visited Luxembourg to discuss their problems 
with the High Authority. Gradually all major issues af-
fecting the two industries were seen in the new European 
perspective. 
Meanwhile, at the High Authority's headquarters 
itself, there came into being a new type of civil servant: 
the European official. He spoke more than one Community 
language, worked harmoniously with colleagues of other 
nationalities on measures for the general good, and under-
stood the interests not only of his own country, but also 
those of other member countries. 
But the most notable result of all was that the ECSC 
paved the way for a further stride towards the unification 
of Europe. Following the signing in March 1957 of the 
Rome Treaty by the governments of the same six countries 
which had set up the ECSC, the European Economic 
Community was created, as was another specialized Com-
munity, the European Atomic Energy Community (Eu-
ratom). 
The aim of the EEC was to complete the unification 
process started by the ECSC by bringing all economic 
activities within a general common market. 
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The Institutions of the two new Communities were 
modelled on the ECSC's - a Commission or executive, 
corresponding to the High Authority, a Council of Min-
isters, and the Parliament and Court of Justice, the two 
latter serving all three Communities. (The three executives 
and Councils have, of course, been merged since July 1, 
1967). There was the same dialogue between the Commis-
sion, which worked out and upheld the common interest, 
and the Council voicing the interests of individual member 
States. 
The Paris Treaty related to specific sectors (coal and 
steel) of the economy. It was therefore practicable to lay 
down a body of detailed rules determining the activities of 
the High Authority and the precise extent of the sover-
eignty surrendered to it by the national governments. But 
to draft a similar Treaty covering all sectors of the economy 
would probably have taken years of exceedingly difficult 
negotiations and produced an extremely long document. 
Instead, the makers of the Rome Treaty confined them-
selves principally to establishing the procedures for en-
acting the Hregulations" which were to embody the Com-
munity's future economic policy in the various fields -
such as agriculture, transport and competition. This means 
that the Commission and Council must co-operate very 
closely. The procedure is that the Commission, by straight 
majority vote, initiates the relevant proposals; then the 
Council decides (at first unanimously but now by weighted 
majority) whether to accept the proposals. It may amend 
a Commission proposal, but only if the Ministers are 
unanimous. 
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An emerging body of Community law is thus the 
product of this continuous dialogue between these two 
separate Institutions. 
The ECSC's difficulties 
The ECSC soon found itself facing difficulties, some 
of which had been foreseen. They were the inevitable 
results of restricting economic integration to the coal 
and steel sectors when all the sectors in the modern 
economy are so closely interknit. The Paris Treaty did not 
establish a common market for transport, but it was im-
possible to create a competitive coal and steel market 
without eliminating discriminatory practices in transport. 
So the Treaty had to venture beyond the field of the two 
heavy industries themselves and lay down a few common 
rules for the transport sector - though it was difficult to 
implement them in respect of coal and steel products only 
and not of any other type of consignment. 
Another defect was the absence of any provision for 
a common trade policy towards non-member countries. 
Obviously, the six governments, being responsible for 
their countries' economic policies as a whole, could not 
be expected to surrender their sovereignty on these to a 
European Institution responsible only for coal and steel. 
On the other hand, it soon proved extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to lay down and carry out consistent, 
effective policies for coal, energy and steel products - all 
of them extensively imported and exported - without a 
common trade policy. But these problems served, and still 
serve, as an incentive to progress. For they demonstrated 
19 
the need to move forward to a general common market for 
all goods. 
There were other difficulties which had not and 
perhaps could not have been foreseen. When the Paris 
Treaty was signed, the six countries wanted to make sure 
they would always have an adequate supply of coal. It 
did not occur to them that a mere five years later a massive 
and permanent coal surplus would develop, following a 
market breakthrough by other fuels, especially oil. The 
High Authority was equipped to deal with temporary, 
cyclical crises. But no thought had been given to the possi-
bility of a structural crisis, jeopardizing the whole future 
of an industry. 
The problem was clearly too big to be tackled on a 
purely "coal" basis: what was needed was a common 
policy on all forms of energy. But responsibility for this 
still lay mainly with the six governments. Such powers as 
existed at European level were divided among the three 
Communities, the ECSC having jurisdiction over coal, the 
EEC over oil, natural gas and electricity, and Euratom 
over nuclear power. It was therefore necessary to set up 
an inter-executive working party on energy, consisting of 
representatives of the High Authority and the EEC and 
Euratom Commissions, which tried to establish a basis for 
a common energy policy. 
The working party submitted several sets of proposals 
from 1958 on to the Council of Ministers. The Council, 
however - while fully recognizing that a common market 
for energy would have to be established within the general 
common market - concluded that the framing of a com-
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moo energy policy would still take considerable time. 
However, in April 1964, on the High Authority's proposal, 
it did adopt a Protocol allowing the latter, pending the 
merger of the Communities (agreed in principle by the 
governments at about the same time), to take emergency 
action in the coal sector. 
The High Authority was now able to pay subsidies, 
in accordance with Community rules and under Com-
munity supervision, to help the coal industry adjust itself 
to the structural crisis. In February 1967 the Council en-
dorsed a High Authority decision setting up a Community 
system of aids for coking coal and coke. 
These measures did not in themselves constitute a 
common energy policy. But they were the first steps 
towards one. They were particularly important because 
member countries' existing energy patterns, and hence 
their individual national interests, differ as widely as they 
do for agriculture. 
This dialogue between the High Authority, which had 
practically no powers under the Treaty to intervene di-
rectly in the entirely unforeseen situation that overtook 
coal, and the governments, which are able to act at national 
level, enabled arrangements in the common interest to be 
devised without infringing the basic requirements of the 
Treaty. 
The same Community method was adopted to deal 
with the difficulties which have arisen in the steel sector 
since 1963. Again, these are not cyclical troubles of the 
type envisaged by the Treaty, but a more permanent 
change in market conditions. The problem is one of 
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widespread overcapacity, which is depressing the Com-
munity steel industry's prices, and consequently its 
revenue, at a time when it ought to be making an intensive 
modernization and rationalization drive in order to 
compete effectively with well-equipped counterparts 
elsewhere in the world. Here, too, the High Authority, 
while itself doing all it could under the Treaty rules, 
co-operated with the six governments in seeking Com-
munity-level solutions. 
The main object was to get the steel market on to a 
sound economic basis by restoring some degree of disci-
pline in production and pricing, reorganizing the industry 
into larger and hence more efficient units, and scrapping 
obsolete plants whose output was harming the market. 
National-level changes planned by some member govern-
ments may well assist this process, provided they are not 
mutually contradictory - in other words, provided they 
are dovetailed into a common steel policy. The High 
Authority submitted proposals to this effect to the Council 
of Ministers. 
Both the energy and the steel sectors are therefore 
going through a period of radical change. This does not 
make the work of European unification easier. But these 
changes would have occurred in any case, and the prob-
lems they cause can now be tackled jointly. In fact, some 
of them could not easily have been solved by traditional 
means. 
The future 
The ECSC was the first concrete step towards the 
economic unification of Europe. It established a new 
22 
system of inter-State relations through its system of com-
mon Institutions, and a new method of economic organiza-
tion through an enlarged market under common rules. In 
this way it laid the basis for the wider European Economic 
Community. 
But what it did above all was to demonstrate that 
the Community system worked. The system was not 
foolproof; it had never been tried before, and it did, as 
time went on, have to be adapted to changing conditions. 
It had to cope increasingly with circumstances for which 
the Treaty makes no provision, often with exceedingly 
difficult cases where the interests of the member States 
were diametrica11y opposed. Nevertheless, it progressed 
slowly but surely towards agreed common action. 
Its vitality lay in its adaptability. This is retained in 
the new single Commission of the three Communities. 
The experience of the High Authority wi11 be preserved 
when the time comes for the merger of the Communities 
themselves under a single Treaty, and when the Com-
munity is expanded geographica11y to include other Euro-
pean countries, although an increase in membership may 
mean changes in the Community's structure. 
The world of today is modelled on Europe and Euro-
pean ideas and practices. For many years Europe's 
influence was so great that it had no need of unity to be 
paramount in many spheres - economic, political, cultural, 
scientific. But, nowadays, it must become united and strong 
if it is to make its voice heard at a11. The continent that gave 
technological civilization to the world is faced with the 
prospect of declining ultimately into a relatively under-
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developed area unless it combines in an all-out drive to 
close the technological gap between its current achieve-
ments and those of the super-powers. Itself the biggest 
exporter of human brain-power, Europe is now also the 
biggest importer of technological inventions devised 
elsewhere. 
Like the process of national unification by which 
the countries of Europe themselves came into being, the 
process of European unification will evolve through 
gradual growth to political maturity. Each of our countries 
has passed through a period when it appeared impossible 
to most people that there should be one institution with 
effective powers and whose writ should run over the 
length and breadth of the land. Yet such national institu-
tions did emerge and were accepted. Little by little men 
came to feel they belonged to a larger entity than their own 
village or town or country - first as they found them-
selves compelled to stand together against a foreign foe, 
later as they desired to build up a state in line with the 
needs of their day. 
Europe has completed the first stage in its unification, 
acceptance of the need to close ranks. It has now moved 
into the second, the stage of recasting its political and 
economic organization in the mould of the present age. 
The Community concept has shown it the way. Since 
the Community works by dialogue and has for ever 
relegated ordeal by combat to the past, we have to accept 
that unification will be a long and difficult process. Yet 
some day, in a form we still cannot know, Europe will 
accept political unity too. 
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